Barclays Bank Plc
Reference number: 122702
Instant download
Authorised by the FCA
This firm is on the FCA register and authorised to carry out regulated activities.
Identity
Check their details
Compare these against whatever you were given. Scammers clone real firm names and reference numbers but use their own phone number and website, so a detail that does not match the register is the clearest warning sign there is.
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Verified website
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Verified phone number
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Verified address
1 Churchill Place, London, E14 5HP, United Kingdom
Also trades as 20 other names
- Barclaycard
- Barclays
- Barclays Business
- Barclays Capital
- Barclays Corporate Banking
- Barclays Financial Planning
- Barclays Funds and Advisory
- Barclays Global Investors Securities
- Barclays Infrastructure Funds Management
- Barclays International Private Bank
- Barclays Investment Bank
- Barclays Investments
- Barclays Investments Online
- Barclays Local Business
- Barclays Natural Resource Investments
- Barclays Personal Investment Management
- Barclays Private Bank
- Barclays UK & Ireland Private Bank
- Barclays Wealth
- BARX
Company details
From the company's Companies House record.
- Company number
- 01026167
- Company status
- Active
- Company type
- Public limited company
- Incorporated
- 4 October 1971 (54 years old)
- Registered office
- Matches the FCA register address ✓
- Nature of business
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- Banks (SIC 64191)
Current directors and secretaries
| Name | Role | Born | Appointed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nigel Paul Higgins | Director | Sep 1960 | 1 Mar 2019 |
| Dawn Fitzpatrick | Director | Feb 1970 | 25 Sep 2019 |
| Coimbatore Sundararajan Venkatakrishnan | Director | Jan 1966 | 1 Nov 2021 |
| Robert Berry | Director | May 1964 | 8 Feb 2022 |
| Angela Anna Cross | Director | Jul 1970 | 23 Apr 2022 |
| Menasey Marc Moses | Director | Nov 1957 | 23 Jan 2023 |
| Julia Susan Wilson | Director | Sep 1967 | 1 Apr 2023 |
| Brian Thomas Shea | Director | Jul 1960 | 19 Jul 2024 |
| Mary Tabb Mack | Director | Oct 1962 | 1 Jun 2025 |
| Hannah Elisabeth Ellwood | Secretary | Not published | 15 Feb 2023 |
Warning
Scammers have impersonated this firm
Fraudsters have used this firm's name or details with their own contact information to appear genuine. Check whatever you were given below, and against the firm's real details above.
Fake phone numbers (14)
- +16577601476
- +1 757 690 0668
- +46550780013
- 020 3769 0975
- 020 3816 1658
- 020 7060 3109
- 020 7060 9367
- 020 7060 9971
- 020 7097 3986
- 020 7099 6123
- 020 7193 6804
- 020 7193 7678
- 0800 802 1852
- 0843 604 2345
Fake email addresses (16)
- barclays@wealth-management-services.com
- barlays@wealth-management-services.co.uk
- christinakelly713@gmail.com
- e.white@intl-barclays.com
- fixed-income@barcap.uk
- m.burgess@intl-barclays.com
- m.topley@intl-barclays.com
- name@barcapwealth.com
- noreply@eu-barclays.com
- noreply@international-barclays.com
- p.pay@eu-barclays.com
- p.pay@international-barclays.com
- r.clar@eu-barclays.com
- r.clark@international-barclays.com
- support@aprochbank.com
- support@londoninvestment.net
Fake websites (4)
- aprochbank.com
- londoninvestment.net
- wealth-management-services.co.uk
- wealth-management-services.com
The 6 FCA warnings these came from
- The London Investment Bank 8 May 2025
- eu-barclays.com / international-barclays.com / intl-barclays.com 7 October 2024
- Barclays Wealth Management / Barclays Wealth / www.wealth-management-services.com 24 October 2023
- Barclays Capital 7 June 2021
- Aproch Bank 11 November 2019
- UK RBB Barclays Business 3 February 2014
Scammers change these details often. Always check the live FCA warning.
Activities and protection
What they can do, and how you are protected
- Hold or safeguard your money · Handle payments & transfers FSCS may applyEligible deposits are typically protected by the FSCS up to £120,000 per person, per banking group.
- Give regulated advice FSCS may applyA claim for unsuitable advice is itself FSCS-protected, up to the limit that applies to the product you were advised on.
- Manage or trade investments · Run or oversee funds FSCS may applyEligible investment and pension claims are typically FSCS-protected up to £85,000 per person, depending on the product and your circumstances.
- Sell or arrange insurance FSCS may applyEligible insurance claims may be FSCS-protected, often 90%, or 100% for compulsory or long-term cover.
- Advise on or arrange mortgages · Arrange equity release FSCS may applyMortgage advice and arranging may be FSCS-covered, up to the limit that applies.
- Lend or arrange credit · Hire out goods to consumers No FSCS coverConsumer credit is not covered by the FSCS, so there is no compensation scheme if the firm fails.
Show FCA detail (39 permissions)
- Accepting Deposits
- Acting as a CBTL administrator
- Acting as a CBTL advisor
- Acting as a CBTL arranger
- Acting as a CBTL lender
- Acting as trustee or depositary of an unauthorised AIF
- Administering a Benchmark
- Administering a regulated mortgage contract
- Advising on a regulated credit agreement the purpose of which is to acquire land
- Advising on investments (except on Pension Transfers and Pension Opt Outs)
- Advising on regulated mortgage contracts
- Arranging (bringing about) a home reversion plan
- Arranging (bringing about) deals in investments
- Arranging (bringing about) regulated mortgage contracts
- Arranging safeguarding and administration of assets
- Assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance
- Bidding in emissions auctions
- Causing dematerialised instructions to be sent
- Credit Broking
- Dealing in investments as agent
- Dealing in investments as principal
- Debt Adjusting
- Debt Administration
- Debt-collecting
- Debt-counselling
- Entering into a regulated mortgage contract as lender
- Entering into Regulated Consumer Hire Agreements as owner
- Entering into regulated credit agreement as Lender (Excluding high-cost short-term credit, bill of sale agreement, and home collected credit agreement)
- Establishing, operating or winding up a collective investment scheme
- Exercising/having right to exercise lender's rights and duties under a regulated credit agreement (excluding high-cost short-term credit, bill of sale agreement, and home collected credit agreement)
- Exercising or having the right to exercise the owner's rights and duties under a regulated consumer hire agreement
- Issuing Electronic Money
- Making arrangements with a view to a home reversion plan
- Making arrangements with a view to regulated mortgage contracts
- Making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments
- Managing investments
- Providing Credit Information Services
- Safeguarding and administration of assets (without arranging)
- Sending dematerialised instructions
Limits on what they may do
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Permitted to canvass off trade premises
The firm is permitted to canvass regulated borrower-lender-supplier agreements or regulated consumer hire agreements off trade premises.
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Access to the electoral register
The firm shall access the full electoral register, where this is the most cost-effective way of verifying identity for anti-money laundering purposes and will not prejudice the interests of the customer, in order to carry out the current customer review exercise.
4 supervisory conditions set by the FCA
These are conditions the FCA places on the firm itself, covering things like capital it must hold and what it must report. They do not change what the firm may do for you.
- Requirement to the IMM Permission 1713270
Capital buffer requirement 1. The IMM Permission is subject to the requirement that, in relation to exposures to power and gas products: 1.1. The firm must hold a capital buffer as an adjustment to its capital resources requirement corresponding to at least 10% of the risk weighted exposure amount calculated under the IMM Permission; 1.2. This capital buffer must be held until the firm extends its simulation methodology to account for seasonal volatility; and 1.3. The firm must continuously monitor the impact of seasonal volatility on its material risk factors. Repurchase transactions 2. The IMM Permission is subject to the requirement that if the firm's exposures to repurchase transactions which are committed become material in size and risk, it must either treat them as fully drawn for exposure measurement and capital purposes or demonstrate to the PRA that the relevant model covered by the IMM Permission appropriately reflects the risks inherent in their contractual terms. Reporting requirements 3. The firm must collect, record, and report to the PRA the following information on a quarterly basis in each calendar year: 3.1. its counterparty credit risk (CCR) EAD and CCR RWAs at aggregate level, and divided by exposure type (OTC derivatives, listed derivatives, repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions and margin lending transactions); 3.2. its exposures divided by exposure type, counterparty sector and by counterparty credit rating, showing both level and trend; 3.3. the composition of collateral for OTC derivatives, showing both average level of collateral types and trend by collateral type; 3.4. backtesting results on representative (actual or hypothetical) counterparty portfolios, including the results on the following: * 10, 20 or 40-day backtesting for collateralised transactions of OTC derivatives; * 5, 10 or 20-day backtesting for repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions and margin lending transactions; and * backtesting over at least a year for representative uncollateralised transactions; 3.5. where the model relies on mapping to proxy transactions, or on proxy market data, a list of the affected products showing both the level and trend of these products and the results of the analysis to estimate the appropriateness of proxies for counterparty credit risk exposure calculation. 3.6. the results and analysis performed to calculate all capital adjustments held where there are identified limitations in the firm's CCR models and processes. 4. The firm must inform the PRA of any event that may have a significant impact on its IMM permission, including in particular: 4.1. changes to the list of asset classes, products or counterparties listed in Table 2 of Annex 1; 4.2. use of a different model for exposure calculations under the IMM permission; 4.3. changes to governance or senior management arrangements in relation to the IMM permission; 4.4. changes to the volumes or trends of trading for assets classes, products or counterparties listed in Table 2 of Annex 1; and 4.5. changes to the volumes or trends of trading for legal entities in the scope of the IMM permission. 5. For power and gas products: * the proportion of products using proxies; * the proportion of exposure attributable to proxied products. Maintenance of the group 6. This permission applies to each firm for as long as they remain part of the group headed by Barclays PLC.
- Report annually to FCA and PRA on whistleblowing
Details of the FCA requirement can be found at this link - https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/requirement-notices/vreq-barclays-bank-plc.pdf Details of the PRA requirement can be found at this link - www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/BoE/Files/prudential-regulation/regulatory-action/written-notice-from-the-pra-to-barclays-bank-plc
- Requirements added to Art 325 Permission (2227405)
1. This Market Risk Consolidation Permission applies to an institution or undertaking listed in Table 1 only for as long as it remains part of the Barclays Group. The firm must notify the PRA promptly if any of those institutions or undertakings ceases to be part of the Barclays Group. 2. The firm must, no later than 23 business days after the end of each quarter, ending March, June, September and December submit, in respect of that quarter, a report to the PRA highlighting the capital impact of market risk consolidation for each of the institutions listed in Table 1. 3. The firm must: 1. ensure that any existing legal agreements or arrangements necessary for fulfilment of the conditions of Article 325(2) of the CRR as between any of the institutions in Table 1 are maintained; and 2. notify the PRA of any variation in the terms of such agreements, or of any change in the relevant legal or regulatory framework of which it becomes aware and which may have an impact on the ability of any of the institutions listed in Table 1 to meet the conditions of Article 325(2) of the CRR.
- Written Notice - Market Risk Consolidation
REQUIREMENTS RELEVANT TO THE MARKET RISK CONSOLIDATION PERMISSION THAT THE FIRM HAS SOUGHT AND THE PRA IMPOSES UNDER SECTION 55M (5) OF THE ACT 1.This Market Risk Consolidation Permission applies to an institution or undertaking listed in Table 1 only for as long as it remains part of the Barclays Group. The firm must notify the PRA promptly if any of those institutions or undertakings ceases to be part of the Barclays Group. 2.The firm must, no later than 23 business days after the end of each quarter, ending March, June, September and December submit, in respect of that quarter, a report to the PRA highlighting the capital impact of market risk consolidation for each of the institutions listed in Table 1. 3.The firm must: 1.ensure that any existing legal agreements or arrangements necessary for fulfilment of the conditions of Article 325(2) of the CRR as between any of the institutions in Table 1 are maintained; and 2.notify the PRA of any variation in the terms of such agreements, or of any change in the relevant legal or regulatory framework of which it becomes aware and which may have an impact on the ability of any of the institutions listed in Table 1 to meet the conditions of Article 325(2) of the CRR. THE MARKET RISK CONSOLIDATION PERMISSION Legal Entities 1.The Market Risk Consolidation Permission means that the firm may use positions in an institution or undertaking listed in Table 1 to offset positions in another institution or undertaking listed therein only for the purposes of calculating net positions and own funds requirements in accordance with Title IV of the CRR on a consolidated basis. Table 1 Institutions and Location of undertaking: Barclays Bank PLC (BBPLC) - UK Barclays Capital Securities Limited (BCSL) UK Barclays Bank Ireland - Ireland
Complaints: You can refer a complaint about this firm to the Financial Ombudsman Service for free, whichever activity it relates to.
Track record
Action taken against them, and what customers complained about
12 fines between 2009 and 2025, £530.03m across 9 of the 12 that state an amount. This is part of the official register record and is worth reviewing before going ahead.
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Fined £39.31m on 16 July 2025
On 14 July 2025 the Authority imposed a financial penalty of £39,314,700 on Barclays Bank Plc (“Barclays”) for its breach of Principle 2 (skill, care and diligence) of the Authority’s Principles for Businesses that occurred between 9 January 2015 and 23 April 2021. Barclays agreed to resolve this matter and qualified for a 30% (stage 1) discount under the Authority’s executive settlement procedures. Were it not for this discount, the Authority would have imposed a financial penalty of £56,163,900 on Barclays. Barclays’ breach relates to its failures to identify, assess, monitor and manage adequately the money laundering risks associated with the provision of banking services to one of its corporate banking customers.
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Fined on 25 November 2024
Final Notice 2024: Barclays plc and Final Notice 2024: Barclays Bank plc.
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Fined on 23 September 2022
On 23 September 2022, the FCA decided to impose a financial penalty on Barclays Bank Plc. The reason for this action is because Barclays Bank Plc failed to comply with Listing Rule 1.3.3 in October 2008. This matter has been referred by Barclays Bank Plc to the Upper Tribunal. The FCA’s findings and proposed action are therefore provisional and will not take effect pending determination of this matter by the Upper Tribunal. The FCA’s decision was issued on 23 September 2022 and a copy of the Decision Notice is displayed on the FCA's web site.
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Fined £783,800 on 24 February 2022
On 24 February 2022, the FCA imposed a financial penalty on Barclays Bank Plc. The reason for this action is because the firm failed to conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence and thereby breached Principle 2. As a consequence of this action, the FCA imposed a penalty of £783,800. The FCA’s action took effect on 24 February 2022 and a copy of the Final Notice is displayed on the FCA's web site.
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Fined on 15 December 2020
On 15 December 2020, the FCA fined Barclays Bank UK PLC, Barclays Bank PLC, Clydesdale Financial Services Limited (Barclays) . The reason for this action is that between 1 April 2014 and 31 December 2018, Barclays breached Principles 6 and 3 of the Authority’s Principles for Businesses and CONC 6.7.2R, 7.2.1R and 7.3.4R from its Consumer Credit sourcebook by failing to show forbearance and due consideration to business and retail customers when they fell into arrears or experienced financial difficulties. The FCA’s action took effect on 15 December 2020 and a copy of the Final Notice is displayed on the FCA's web site.
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Fined £72.07m on 25 November 2015
On 25 November 2015, the Authority imposed a financial penalty of £72,069,400 on Barclays Bank plc (“Barclays”) for breaches of Principle 2 (due skill, care and diligence) between 23 May 2011 and 24 November 2014 (“the Relevant Period”). Barclays agreed to settle at an early stage of the Authority’s investigation. Barclays therefore qualified for a 30% (Stage 1) discount under the Authority’s executive settlement procedures. Were it not for this discount, the Authority would have imposed a financial penalty of £80,542,000 on Barclays. Barclays failed to minimise the risk of financial crime in connection with a multi-billion pound Transaction executed for ultra-high net worth politically exposed persons (the Clients). As a result of the confidentiality requirements, Barclays determined that’s its usual processes for dealing with PEPs and assessing financial crime risks were not appropriate for the Business Relationship. Instead, Barclays sought to address the financial crime risks associated with the Transaction in an ad hoc way. In doing so, Barclays did not exercise due skill, care and diligence. It failed to identify, assess and monitor any risks appropriately. Specifically, in breach of Principle 2: a) Barclays’ front office and senior management failed adequately to oversee Barclays’ handling of the financial crime risks that were associated with the Business Relationship. b) Having classified the Clients as Sensitive PEPs, Barclays failed to appropriately identify and address through its due diligence processes a number of features of the Business Relationship that the Authority considers could have indicated a higher risk of financial crime. c) Barclays did not follow its standard procedures that it would normally follow for establishing relationships with Sensitive PEPs or put acceptable alternative procedures in their place. d) Barclays failed to establish adequately the purpose and nature of the Transaction and did not sufficiently corroborate the Clients’ stated source of wealth and source of funds for the Transaction. e) Barclays failed to monitor appropriately the financial crime risks associated with the Business Relationship on an ongoing basis. f) Barclays failed to maintain adequate records of the due diligence it undertook in connection with the Business Relationship and to ensure that those records were readily identifiable and capable of retrieval. As a consequence, Barclays’ threatened confidence in the UK financial system and failed to mitigate the risk to society of financial crime. A copy of the Final Notice is displayed on the Authority’s web site and can be accessed.
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Fined £284.43m on 20 May 2015
The Financial Conduct Authority (the “FCA”) has imposed a financial penalty of £284,432,000 on Barclays Bank Plc, FRN 122702, 1 Churchill Place, London, E14 5HP. The FCA’s action took effect on 20 May 2015 and a copy of the Final Notice, which sets out the reason for the action, is displayed on the FCA's web site and can be accessed using the following link: https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-notices/2015/barclays-bank-plc The reason for this action is that Barclays failed properly to control its London voice trading operations in its G10 spot FX; Emerging Market spot FX and G10 and EM FX options businesses and its G10 and EM FX sales operations associated with its FX business.
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Fined £37.74m on 24 September 2014
On 23 September 2014, the Authority imposed a financial penalty of £37,745,000 on Barclays Bank plc (Barclays) for breaches of Principles 3 (Management and Control) and 10 (Clients' Assets) of the Authority's Principles for Businesses (the Principles) and associated Client Asset Rules (CASS) in the FCA's Handbook. Barclays agreed to settle at an early stage of the Authority's investigation. Barclays therefore qualified for a 30% (Stage 1) discount under the Authority's executive settlement procedures. Were it not for this discount, the Authority would have imposed a financial penalty of £53,921,619 on Barclays. Barclays failed to adequately protect approximately £16.5 billion of clients' safe custody assets between 1 November 2007 and 24 January 2012 (the Relevant Period). The Authority found significant deficiencies in Barclays' systems and controls in the opening, on-going operation and monitoring of external safe custody accounts, and failures in arranging adequate protection for certain of the safe custody assets for which it was responsible. Specifically, in relation to its safe custody assets arrangements in its Investment Banking Division, during the Relevant Period Barclays breached: a) Principle 3: by failing to take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly with adequate risk management systems in order to ensure that it: i. had in place adequate organisational arrangements in respect of safe custody assets; and ii. implemented and maintained adequate policies and procedures to detect and manage its safe custody asset risks. b) Principle 10: by failing to arrange adequate protection for safe custody assets when it was responsible for them. Barclays' failings also meant that it breached CASS 1A.2.8R, 6.2.1R, 6.2.2R, 6.3.1R, 6.5.1R, 6.5.2R and 6.5.6R. As a consequence of Barclays' breaches its' clients were at risk of incurring extra costs, lengthy delays or losing their assets if Barclays had become insolvent during the Relevant Period. A copy of the Final Notice is displayed on the Authority's web site and can be accessed.
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Fined £26.03m on 27 May 2014
1. On 23 May 2014, the FCA imposed a penalty of £26,033,500 on Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays) for breaches of Principles 3 and 8, for failing to manage conflicts of interest, as well as systems and controls failings in relation to the London Gold Fixing. Were it not for the Stage 1 settlement discount, the penalty would have been £37,190,800. Conflicts of Interest 2. Between 7 June 2004 and 21 March 2013 (Relevant Period), Barclays breached Principle 8 by failing to adequately manage certain conflicts of interest between itself and its customers. In particular, Barclays failed to adequately manage the inherent conflict of interest that existed from (i) Barclays participating in the Gold Fixing and contributing to the price fixed during the Gold Fixing, while at the same time also (ii) selling to customers options products that referenced, and were dependent on, the price of gold fixed in the Gold Fixing, by not putting in place policies, procedures, systems and training in relation to the Gold Fixing which would have adequately enabled its staff to properly identify and manage the risks arising from this inherent conflict of interest. 3. Barclays' lack of specific training and guidance, given the absence of clear and sufficiently-tailored policies and procedures with respect to the Gold Fixing, meant that Barclays' personnel (including supervisors) may have been unaware of which conflicts of interest they should pay particular attention to in relation to the Gold Fixing. 4. On 28 June 2012 the risk created by Barclays' failure to adequately manage the inherent conflict of interest was realised when a Barclays trader participated actively in the 3:00 p.m. Gold Fixing even though he was responsible for risk-managing an options contract that was dependent on the price of gold fixed in that Gold Fixing. The Barclays trader placed orders with intention of increasing the likelihood that the price of gold would fix below a certain level, preferring his interests over those of a customer. Systems and controls failings 5. For the following reasons, Barclays breached Principle 3 by failing to take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively with adequate risk management systems in relation to the London Gold Fixing process: (i) During the Relevant Period Barclays failed to create or implement adequate policies or procedures to properly manage the way in which Barclays' traders participated in the Gold Fixing; (ii) During the Relevant Period Barclays failed to provide adequate specific training to Precious Metals Desk staff in relation to their participation in the Gold Fixing; and (iii) During the Relevant Period Barclays failed to create systems and reports that allowed for adequate monitoring of its traders' activity in connection with the Gold Fixing. The systems and reports did not formally record orders placed by traders in the Gold Fixing until 5 February 2013 and did not identify Gold Fixing transactions separately from general gold spot trades until 21 March 2013.
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Fined £59.5m on 4 July 2012
On 27 June 2012, the FSA imposed a penalty of £59.5 million on Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays) in accordance with section 206 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The fine was imposed for Barclays' breaches of Principles 2, 3 and 5 through misconduct relating to its submissions of rates which formed part of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), and in respect of the submission of rates for the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) setting processes. There was a risk that Barclays' misconduct would threaten the integrity of these benchmark reference rates. Barclays agreed to settle at an early stage of the FSA's investigation. Barclays therefore qualified for a 30% (stage 1) discount under the FSA's executive settlement procedures. Were it not for this discount, the FSA would have imposed a financial penalty of £85 million on Barclays. LIBOR and EURIBOR are benchmark reference rates fundamental to the operation of both UK and international financial markets, including markets in interest rate derivatives contracts. LIBOR and EURIBOR are by far the most prevalent benchmark reference rates used in euro, US dollar and sterling over the counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives contracts and exchange traded interest rate contracts. LIBOR and EURIBOR are used to determine payments made under both OTC interest rate derivatives contracts and exchange traded interest rate contracts by a wide range of counterparties including small businesses, large financial institutions and public authorities. Benchmark reference rates such as LIBOR and EURIBOR also affect payments made under a wide range of other contracts including loans and mortgages. The integrity of benchmark reference rates such as LIBOR and EURIBOR is therefore of fundamental importance to both UK and international financial markets. - Inappropriate submissions following requests by derivatives traders Barclays acted inappropriately and breached Principle 5 on numerous occasions between January 2005 and July 2008 by making US dollar LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions which took into account requests made by its interest rate derivatives traders (Derivatives Traders). At times these included requests made on behalf of derivatives traders at other banks. The Derivatives Traders were motivated by profit and sought to benefit Barclays' trading positions. The definitions of LIBOR and EURIBOR require submissions from contributing banks based on borrowing or lending in the interbank market. The definitions do not allow for consideration of derivatives traders' positions. It was inappropriate for Barclays to make US dollar LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions which took its Derivatives Traders' positions (or the positions of traders at other banks) into account. Barclays did not therefore observe proper standards of market conduct when making US dollar LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions. Barclays also breached Principle 5 on numerous occasions between February 2006 and October 2007 by seeking to influence the EURIBOR (and to a much lesser extent the US dollar LIBOR) submissions of other banks contributing to the rate setting process. Where Barclays made submissions which took into account the requests of its own Derivatives Traders, or sought to influence the submissions of other banks, there was a risk that the published LIBOR and EURIBOR rates would be manipulated. Barclays could have benefitted from this misconduct to the detriment of other market participants. Where Barclays acted in concert with other banks, the risk of manipulation increased materially. - Inappropriate submissions to avoid negative media comment Barclays acted inappropriately and breached Principle 5 on numerous occasions between September 2007 and May 2009 by making LIBOR submissions which took into account concerns over the negative media perception of Barclays' LIBOR submissions. Liquidity issues were a particular focus for Barclays and other banks dur the financial crisis and banks' LIBOR submissions were seen by some commentators as a measure of their ability to raise funds. Barclays was identified in the media as having higher LIBOR submissions than other contributing banks at the outset of the financial crisis. Barclays believed that other banks were making LIBOR submissions that were too low and did not reflect market conditions. The media questioned whether Barclays' submissions indicated that it had a liquidity problem. Senior management at high levels within Barclays expressed concerns over this negative publicity. Senior management's concerns in turn resulted in instructions being given by less senior managers at Barclays to reduce LIBOR submissions in order to avoid negative media comment. The origin of these instructions is unclear. Barclays' LIBOR submissions continued to be high relative to other contributing banks' submissions during the financial crisis. - Systems and controls failings Barclays breached Principle 3 from January 2005 until June 2010 (the Relevant Period) by failing to have adequate risk management systems or effective controls in place in relation to its LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions processes. Barclays had no specific systems and controls in place relating to its LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions processes until December 2009 (when Barclays started to improve its systems and controls). The extent of Barclays' misconduct was exacerbated by these inadequate systems and controls. Barclays failed, at a number of appropriate points during the Relevant Period, to review whether its systems and controls were adequate. - Compliance failings Barclays failed to conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence when considering issues raised internally in relation to its LIBOR submissions. Barclays therefore breached Principle 2. LIBOR issues were escalated to Barclays' Investment Banking compliance function (Compliance) on three occasions during 2007 and 2008. In each case Compliance failed to assess and address the issues effectively. Compliance's failures meant that Barclays' breaches of Principles 5 and 3 were allowed to continue. Compliance's failures also led to unclear and insufficient communication about issues to the FSA. - Penalty The integrity of benchmark reference rates such as LIBOR and EURIBOR is of fundamental importance to both UK and international financial markets. Barclays' misconduct could have caused serious harm to other market participants. Barclays' misconduct also created the risk that the integrity of LIBOR and EURIBOR would be called into question and that confidence in or the stability of the UK financial system would be threatened. The FSA therefore considers it is appropriate to impose a very significant financial penalty of £59.5 million on Barclays in relation to its misconduct during the Relevant Period. In determining the appropriate level of penalty, the FSA has had regard to mitigating factors. In particular, Barclays has provided extremely good co-operation during the course of the FSA's investigation. Barclays' co-operation has enabled the FSA to conduct its investigation efficiently and expeditiously. William Amos Head of Department, Retail 1
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Fined £7.7m on 18 January 2011
On 14 January 2011 the FSA imposed a financial penalty of £7.7 million on Barclays Bank plc (Barclays) for breaches of the FSA's Principles and rules which occurred between July 2006 and November 2008 in relation the sale of Aviva's Global Balanced Income Fund and Global Cautious Income Fund (the 'Funds'). Barclays agreed to settle at an early stage of the FSA's investigation. It therefore qualified for a 30% (Stage 1) discount under the FSA's executive settlement procedures. Were it not for this discount, the FSA would have imposed a financial penalty of £11m on Barclays. Barclays breached Principle 9 during the Relevant Period in that it failed to take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice regarding the Funds for customers entitled to rely upon its judgement. The customers were typically in or near retirement and included inexperienced investors. The firm's failings include the following: (1) The training material given to Barclays staff was inadequate. It did not identify the types of customers the Funds were suitable for. Nor did it explain clearly that, when markets go down, customers who drew income from the Funds were at risk of their capital being eroded and the amount of income they could draw declining over time. In relation to the Balanced Fund, it did not state that these were significant risks. The training material failed to make staff aware that the Funds were unlikely to be appropriate for customers who wanted capital growth as an investment objective. (2) The sales briefs and product updates Barclays sent to its advisers increased the risk of the Funds being mis-sold because they referred only to the potential benefits of investing in the Funds. They did not refer to any of the risks nor the need for those risks to be clearly communicated to prospective customers. (3) Product brochures and other documentation given to customers contained inadequate information and statements which could have misled customers about the nature and levels of risk involved. The documents did not clearly and prominently explain the extent to which an investment in the Funds was linked to fluctuations in the stock market. For those who drew income from the Funds, it did not explain the risk of capital loss and the negative impact this would have on the amount of income produced by the Funds. (4) Barclays failed to put in place adequate procedures for monitoring of sales of the Funds and this resulted in a failure to promptly identify and investigate potentially unsuitable sales. Where compliance monitoring identified particular issues, Barclays failed to take appropriate and timely action, including by implementing a past business review. Barclays also breached COB 5.3.5R and COBS 9.2.1R. As a consequence of the above failings, Barclays customers were exposed to an unacceptable risk of unsuitable sales and a number of unsuitable sales were made. By 7 December 2010, 1676 customers had complained about their investment in the Funds and compensation of approximately £17 million had been paid. It is expected that further compensation of between £20 million and £42 million will be paid. Seriousness of the breaches and mitigating factors The breaches are viewed as particularly serious because Barclays identified, at an early stage, concerns with the Funds but did not take adequate steps to mitigate those concerns. In particular, Barclays identified: 1. The Funds' enhanced income objective was likely to appeal to vulnerable customers, such as those inexperienced in stock market investments and the elderly looking to invest their retirement savings to generate additional income. 2. Customers may not be able to understand the risks of the Funds because of their complex characteristics. 3. In relation to the Balanced Fund, that its risk categorisation was at the upper end of 'balanced' and additional controls in its sales processes were therefore required to mitigate thiskof unsuitable sales. The FSA has also taken the following into account when considering the seriousness of the breaches: 1. A large number of investors were placed at risk and the potential impact was significant. During the Relevant Period, the total number of customers who invested in the Funds is 12,331 with investments totalling £692 million. 2. The mis-conduct spanned more than 2 years. Barclays is undertaking a comprehensive past business review to ensure that customers do not lose out as a result of the failings identified by the FSA. In particular, Barclays has agreed in consultation with the FSA for a third party firm of accountants to review customer files for sales made during the Relevant Period to ascertain whether those sales were suitable. As part of this process, customers may be contacted if this is necessary to allow a decision on suitability to be made. For those sales which are found to be unsuitable, redress will be paid to the customer to ensure he or she has not lost out financially. Barclays past business review described above has been taken into account when deciding upon the level of disciplinary sanction. It is difficult to predict at this stage, but the total amount Barclays will have to pay to customers could be as much as £60 million.
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Fined £2.45m on 8 September 2009
On 19 August 2009, the FSA imposed a penalty on Barclays Bank plc and Barclays Capital Securities Limited (Barclays) of £2,450,000 (discounted from £3,500,000 for early settlement) in respect of breaches of SUP 17 of the FSA Handbook and breaches of Principles 2 and 3 of the FSA's Principles for Businesses which occurred between 1 October 2006 and 31 October 2008. The breach of SUP 17 related to Barclays failure to submit accurate transaction reports as required in respect of an estimated 57.5 million transactions. Barclays breached Principle 2 by failing to conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence in failing to respond sufficiently to opportunities to review the adequacy of its transaction reporting systems. Barclays breached Principle 3 by failing to take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems, to meet the requirements to submit accurate transaction reports to the FSA
Past business
The FCA has required this firm to go back over business it already did and put things right where customers lost out. Each entry below is the FCA's own wording, and several may amend one scheme rather than describe separate ones.
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Amendment to a consumer redress exercise
The Requirements became effective on 27 January 2015 and were supplemented on 15 May 2015. The Requirements shall be supplemented as follows: The definition of 'Scheme of Arrangement' at paragraph 1.33 of the Requirements shall mean the solvent scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 described more particularly in Annex 1 hereto and all references in the Requirements to ”Scheme Document shall be references to the Scheme of Arrangement in Annex 1 hereto. Changes to the Scheme of Arrangement originally appended to the Requirements are highlighted through underlined or struck through text. Paragraph 5.1 of Part 3 of Annex B of the Requirements shall be amended so as to read as follows: If a Scheme Creditor disagrees with the amount of compensation payable to him, he may initiate the Dispute Resolution Procedure to refer the dispute to the Scheme Adjudicator, provided he does so within the time limits specified in Clauses 4.6 and 4.9 of the Scheme Document. If a Scheme Creditor disagrees with the rejection of his Claim Form by the Scheme Administrators, and provided that the Claim Form was received on or before 15 November 2016, he may initiate the Dispute Resolution Procedure to refer the dispute to the Scheme Adjudicator, provided he does so within the time limits specified in Clauses 4.8 to 4.10 of the Scheme Document.
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Amendment to a consumer redress exercise
The Requirements became effective on 13 August 2013. The Requirements shall be supplemented as follows: The definition of 'Scheme of Arrangement' at paragraph 1.28 of the Requirements shall mean the solvent scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 as sanctioned by the Court on 14 January 2014 (as subsequently modified in accordance with its terms) and as described more particularly in Annex 1 to this Supplemental Requirement. Changes to the Scheme of Arrangement as appended to Part 1 of Annex C to the Requirements are highlighted through underlined or struck through text. All references in the Requirements to ”Scheme Document shall be references to the Scheme of Arrangement described more particularly in Annex 1 hereto. Paragraph 5.1 of Part 3 of Annex C of the Requirements shall be amended so as to read as follows: If a Scheme Creditor disagrees with the amount of compensation payable to him, he may initiate the Dispute Resolution Procedure to refer the dispute to the Scheme Adjudicator, provided he does so within the time limits specified in Clauses 4.5 and 4.8 of the Scheme Document. If a Scheme Creditor disagrees with the rejection of his Claim Form by the Scheme Administrators, and provided that the Claim Form was received on or before 22 July 2016, he may initiate the Dispute Resolution Procedure to refer the dispute to the Scheme Adjudicator, provided he does so within the time limits specified in Clauses 4.7 to 4.9 of the Scheme Document.
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Amendment to a consumer redress exercise
Supplemental Requirements 6. The Requirements shall be supplemented as follows: 6.1 A new paragraph 1.21(A) be inserted as follows: 'Extreme Distressed Suppression Population' means Scheme Creditors in respect of whom Schemeco and/or the Scheme Administrators receive a direct communication, in writing or otherwise, from: 1.21(A).1 that Scheme Creditor expressly requesting that no further communication be sent to that Scheme Creditor in connection with the Scheme of Arrangement; or 1.21(A).2 a third party on behalf of a Scheme Creditor stating that the Scheme Creditor is deceased and requesting that no further communication be sent to that Scheme Creditor in connection with the Scheme of Arrangement (provided that the Scheme Administrators are reasonably satisfied that the third party is authorised by law to make such a request on behalf of the Scheme Creditor), and in each case the Scheme Administrators reasonably determine at their discretion on the information available to them that the sending of further communications in connection with the Scheme to the Scheme Creditor will or will be reasonably likely to cause distress or harm.. 6.2 The definition of 'Scheme of Arrangement' at paragraph 1.33 shall mean the solvent scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 described more particularly in Annex 1 hereto and all references in the Requirements to Scheme Document shall be references to the scheme of arrangement in Annex 1 hereto. Scheme Claims Decisioning Procedures 7. The requirements set out in Annex B to the Requirements be supplemented by inserting a new paragraph 5.2 at Part 3 of Annex B as follows: 5.2 Certain time limits apply where Scheme Creditors wish to initiate the Dispute Resolution Procedure or (as part of the Dispute Resolution Procedure) to refer a dispute to the Scheme Adjudicator. These are set out in Clauses 4.6, 4.8, 4.9 and 7.1 of the Scheme of Arrangement.
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Firm must undertake a consumer redress exercise
The firm is required to establish and operate a consumer redress scheme following a finding of mis-selling against Card Protection Plan Limited ('CPPL'), in respect of those customers who were mis-sold policies. 'Policies' (or 'policy') means CPPL's Card Protection Product, where the sale (or renewal) was on or after 14 January 2005 and was before the relevant Amendment Date (as defined in the scheme documentation); and/or CPPL's Identity Protection Product, where the sale (or renewal) was on or after 14 January 2005 and the sale was by telephone. The amount of redress may be calculated to off-set any claims made under the policy. This customer redress scheme must be implemented no later than 30 April 2014. Such consumer redress scheme shall be binding on the Financial Ombudsman Service. Further details are available on the FCA website: www.fca.org.uk
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Firm must undertake a consumer redress exercise
The firm is required to establish and operate a consumer redress scheme scheme to address possible selling issues affecting customers who purchased Card Security Products provided by Affinion International Limited, where the sale (or renewal) of such products was on or after 14 January 2005 and was before the relevant Amendment Date (as defined in the scheme documentation). For full terms see the scheme documentation: www.aischeme.co.uk. The amount of redress may be calculated to off-set any insurance claims made under the Card Security Products. This consumer redress scheme must be implemented no later than 31 October 2015. This consumer redress scheme shall be binding on the Financial Ombudsman Service. Further details are also available on the FCA website: www.fca.org.uk/affinion-scheme.
Names it no longer trades under
This firm has retired 25 trading names. If you were contacted under one of these, the name did belong to this firm, but check the current details above before going ahead.
Show the retired names
- Banca Woolwich
- Barclaycard Bespoke Offers
- Barclays Asset Finance
- Barclays Commercial
- Barclays Corporate
- Barclays Corporate Pensions and Benefits
- Barclays Direct
- Barclays Direct Investing
- Barclays Highland Finance
- Barclays Investment
- Barclays Premier
- Barclays Smart Investor
- Barclays Stockbrokers
- Bespoke Offers
- Bmarkets
- BZW Futures
- Corporate Bank
- ING Direct
- iPath
- Standard Life Cash Savings
- Standard Life Cash Savings & Mortgages
- Standard Life Mortgages
- The Woolwich
- Woolwich
- Woolwich Mortgages
Complaints record
In January–June 2025, the Financial Ombudsman Service received 95 new complaints about this firm, and upheld 33% of the ones it decided.
That is about typical: the median across the firms the Ombudsman reports on is 31%.
- Banking and credit 53
- Investments 40
- Pensions 2
A bigger firm receives more complaints simply because it has more customers. FOS complaints data →
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