Santander UK Plc

Activities and protection

What they can do, and how you are protected

• Hold or safeguard your money FSCS may apply
  Eligible deposits are typically protected by the FSCS up to £120,000 per person, per banking group.
• Give regulated advice FSCS may apply
  A claim for unsuitable advice is itself FSCS-protected, up to the limit that applies to the product you were advised on.
• Manage or trade investments FSCS may apply
  Eligible investment and pension claims are typically FSCS-protected up to £85,000 per person, depending on the product and your circumstances.
• Sell or arrange insurance FSCS may apply
  Eligible insurance claims may be FSCS-protected, often 90%, or 100% for compulsory or long-term cover.
• Advise on or arrange mortgages FSCS may apply
  Mortgage advice and arranging may be FSCS-covered, up to the limit that applies.
• Lend or arrange credit No FSCS cover
  Consumer credit is not covered by the FSCS, so there is no compensation scheme if the firm fails.

Check your FSCS cover →

Complaints: You can refer a complaint about this firm to the Financial Ombudsman Service for free, whichever activity it relates to.

Track record

Action taken against them, and what customers complained about

6 fines between 2003 and 2022, £49.5m across 5 of the 6 that state an amount. This is part of the official register record and is worth reviewing before going ahead.

• Fined on 9 December 2022

  Breach of Principle 3 (systems and controls) by Santander UK Plc relating to the establishment and maintenance of effective AML systems and controls.

  Read the FCA notice →

• Fined £32.82m on 19 December 2018

  The FCA has fined Santander UK plc. The reason for this action is because Santander UK plc breached Principle 3 (management and control) and Principle 6 (customers’ interests) between 1 January 2013 and 11 July 2016 and Principle 11 (relations with regulators) between 26 November 2013 and 1 May 2015.  As a consequence of this action, Santander UK plc has been fined £32,817,800 pursuant to section 206 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.   The FCA’s action took effect on 19 December 2018 and a copy of the Final Notice is displayed on the FCA's website.

  Read the FCA notice →

• Fined £12.38m on 26 March 2014

  On 24 March 2014 the Authority imposed a financial penalty of £12,377,800 on Santander UK plc (Santander) for breaches of principles 7 (Communications with clients) and 9 (Customers: relationships of trust) of the Authority's Principles for Businesses (the Principles) and associated Rules in the Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COBS). Santander agreed to settle at an early stage of the Authority's investigation. Santander qualified for a 30% (Stage 1) discount under the Authority's executive settlement procedures. Were it not for this discount, the Authority would have imposed a financial penalty of £17,682,730 on Santander. Santander breached Principle 7: a) during the period 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2012 by failing to ensure that during the investment sales process appropriate disclosure about Santander, its products and services was provided to customers and that its communications with customers were fair, clear and not misleading; and b) during the period 1 April 2004 to 31 December 2012 by failing to ensure that certain of its financial promotions and communications in relation to its Premium Investments were fair, clear and not misleading. Santander,breached Principle 9 during the period 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2012 by failing to ensure that: a) it had an adequate process in place to ensure that its advisers gathered and took into account all information that was necessary to establish the suitability of investment recommendations; b) it had an adequate process in place for establishing the level of risk its customers were willing and able to take; c) customers received adequate explanations of why investment recommendations were suitable for them; d) there was an adequate process in place, in relation to its Premium Investments, to ensure that regular reviews were carried out to check that investments still met customers' needs; e) it had implemented adequate procedures for monitoring the quality of investment advice and remedial action taken where advice had been found to be unsuitable or unclear; and f) new advisors received adequate training before they started to give advice to customers. A copy of the Final Notice is displayed on the Authority's web site and can be accessed.

  Read the FCA notice →

• Fined £1.5m on 20 February 2012

  On 16 February 2012, the FSA imposed a financial penalty of £1.5m on Santander UK PLC (Santander) for failing to comply with Principle 2 (Skill, care and diligence) and Principle 7 (Communications with clients) of the FSA's Principles for Businesses and Rule 6.1.16 in the Conduct of Business Sourcebook, relating to sales of Santander's structured products during the Period between 1 October 2008 and 6 January 2010. The Final Notice which sets out the reason for the action against Santander can be found on the FSA's website.

• Fined £800,000 on 25 May 2005

  On 25 May 2005, pursuant to Section 206 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), the FSA imposed a financial penalty of £800,000 on Abbey National plc (Abbey/the Firm) because of the following conduct: mishandling of customers' mortgage endowment complaints in the period between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2003; providing the FSA with inaccurate and potentially misleading information in response to the April 2002 'Tiner Letter'. Below is a summary. The full background to and reasons for the penalty can be found in the Final Notice which is available on the Enforcement section of the FSA's website. 2. REASONS FOR THE PENALTY 2.1. The firm accepts that in the period from 1 October 2001 to 30 September 2003 (the relevant period) it breached relevant regulatory rules and principles in relation to the handling of mortgage endowment complaints received from customers. 2.2. In particular, in the period between 1 October 2001 and 30 November 2001 the firm breached Rule 8.2.4 of the Personal Investment Authority rules (the PIA Rules) by failing to ensure that it investigated each mortgage endowment complaint adequately; and, in the period from 1 December 2001 to 30 September 2003 the firm breached FSA DISP Rule 1.2.22 by failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that it handled mortgage endowment complaints fairly and consistently. 2.3. As a result of concerns identified by FSA supervisors, the firm was required to commission an independent, expert report (The S.166 report) on the handling of mortgage endowment complaints in the relevant period. For the purposes of the report, the independent expert reviewed 371 mortgage endowment complaints handled by Abbey in Q4 2001, Q2 2002, Q4 2002, and Q2 2003 (the sample). The detailed findings in relation to the sample are particularised at paragraph 4.18 below but, in summary, the independent expert found complaint handling failures of: 22% in Q4 2001 (11 out of the 50 cases reviewed) 30% in Q2 2002 (24 out of the 78 cases reviewed) 22% in Q4 2002 (32 out of the 148 cases reviewed) 29% in Q2 2003 (30 out of the 101 cases reviewed) In the relevant period Abbey received 37,453 mortgage endowment complaints, decided 20,044 cases and rejected 18,593 (approximately 93%) of total cases decided. Abbey accepts that somewhere in the region of 5,000 of the cases rejected were improperly handled (approximately 26%). The mishandled cases include approximately 3500 complaints which were rejected when they should have been upheld. Although a detailed investigation of cases from every quarter in the four year period between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2004 has not taken place, Abbey accepts that it is likely that there were similar levels of failure to handle cases correctly throughout that period. Abbey received approximately 65,000 mortgage endowment complaints in that period between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2004. 2.4. Further, as a result of the nature and extent of the failings identified, it appears to the FSA that the firm has acted in breach of Principle 6 of the FSA's Principles for Businesses by: failing to pay due regard to the interests of its mortgage endowment customers and failing to treat such customers fairly. 2.5. Further, as a result of the nature and extent of the failings identified, it appears to the FSA that the firm has acted in breach of Principle 2 of the FSA's Principles for Businesses by: failing to act and/or conduct its business with due skill care and diligence in its handling of mortgage endowment complaints; and, failing to exercise due skill care and diligence in respect of its written communications with the FSA concerning the handling of mortgage endowment complaints. In particular, in April and May 2002 Abbey wrote to the FSA in response to the Tiner letter confirming that it was already applying the nine 'Tiner points' in the handling of mortgage endowment complaints. In fact, the S.166 Report found material breaches of three of the Tiner Points in all of the three post-Tiner quarters which were sampled by the skilled person and in particular during April and May 2002 when Abbey wrote to the FSA. The FSA considers the Abbey response to have been unacceptable in the circumstances and considers that such conduct fell well below the standards expected of an authorised firm in its communications with the regulator. 2.6. The failings in mortgage endowment complaint handling are viewed by the FSA as being particularly serious because: (1) the failings related to the handling of complaints about advice which Abbey had given in relation to mortgage endowments - investment policies to be used by customers to repay their mortgage. The purchase of a house is for many people the most significant financial transaction of their lives and where any valid complaint regarding the sale of mortgage endowment policies is unfairly rejected, the consequences may result in serious consumer detriment; (2) in the context of the numbers of complaints received by Abbey, the proportion of complaints that were actually mishandled was unacceptably high and the failings continued over a 2 year period; (3) these failings in mortgage endowment complaints handling resulted in actual financial loss to a large number of Abbey's customers. In practice, the actual loss will be limited to those customers who have suffered loss and whose complaints have been wrongly rejected. Of the 18,593 customers referred to in paragraph 2.4 above, approximately 3,500 of these (19%) had their complaints wrongly rejected. Based upon industry average figures of £5,500 for the average projected shortfall per case, losses of up to £19 million may have been caused to those 3,500 customers. The further 1,500 customers have been exposed to the risk of loss because their complaints were rejected in circumstances where the firm should have sought further information before making its decision to reject, although again the actual loss will be limited to any complaints from the 1,500 which have been wrongly rejected. (4) the failings occurred at a time when there was a high level of awareness of the problems surrounding mortgage endowment sales, and a high level of awareness within the financial services industry of the importance of handling mortgage endowment complaints properly; (5) the failings at Abbey continued after 'the Tiner letter' and the failings continued notwithstanding Abbey's assurances to the FSA that it was already complying with the Tiner points; (6) the failings were not brought to the regulator's attention by the firm, but were discovered by the FSA following enquiries and requests for information. 2.7. Whilst these mortgage endowment complaint handling failings merit a significant financial penalty, the FSA considers that the firm's conduct has been mitigated by the co-operation demonstrated by Abbey and the remedial action proposed. Action taken by the firm includes the following: (1) Since becoming aware of the emerging findings of the S.166 Report, the firm has demonstrated a high level of co-operation with the FSA and a willingness to remedy any consumer detriment which may have been caused. The firm has put forward a voluntary proposal to review all mortgage endowment complaints rejected since 1 January 2000 and to pay redress in any case where the complaint has been unfairly rejected. An independent firm of accountants will be appointed to oversee this review of past mortgage endowment complaints. These steps will mean that Abbey will have in place processes which should ensure that past mortgage endowment complainants will be offered redress where appropriate. Further by virtue of the co-operation with the FSA displayed by Abbey and the necessary remedial action being taken, the risk of disadvantage to customers should be minimised. (2) On becoming aware of the FSA's intention to investigate the matter, the firm has demonstrated its willingness to co-operate fully with the investigation. Abbey has moved quickly to agree the facts of the case, ensuring efficient resolution of the matter, and the firm has received full credit for settlement of the disciplinary case at a very early stage. (3) Abbey has committed itself to the adoption of a new approach to mortgage endowment complaints through a complete revision of its complaints handling procedures. New processes and training, designed and delivered in conjunction with an independent firm of accountants, were initiated in December 2004 for all complaints handlers. These revisions to Abbey's complaints handling function include the following: establishment of a new single complaints handling centre which has been formed by drawing together Abbey's three central complaints handling teams; engaging additional resources to meet the demands of the new complaints handling process and the review of past mortgage endowment complaints; increase in the level of training provided to staff engaged in complaints handling; establishment of a separate group to review past mortgage endowment complaints in order to ensure customers were treated fairly, taking into account the most up-to-date regulatory guidance; obtaining external support and guidance to support the required changes to the complaints handling function; monitoring of quality assurance work on the new mortgage endowment complaints system by an independent firm of accountants. These steps are designed to ensure that past mistakes in the handling of mortgage endowment complaints are not repeated in the future. (4) Abbey has made the issue of mortgage endowment complaints handling a regular item on the agenda of its Board meetings and Executive Committee meetings, until the matter has been concluded in a manner acceptable to the FSA, the Board and the Executive Committee. 2.8. In reaching its decision, the FSA has also taken account of the fact that, following the period in which the failures occurred, Abbey has undergone significant change, in terms of its strategic direction, senior management, and operating model, and the fact that in November 2004, Abbey was acquired by Banco Santander Central Hispano SA BSCH. BSCH has demonstrated its commitment to treating customers fairly by supporting a comprehensive redress package for customers who have been disadvantaged. 2.9. Accordingly, Abbey has received credit for this in the amount of the financial penalty the FSA has decided to impose. Without this level of co-operation, the financial penalty would have been substantially higher.

• Fined £2m on 9 December 2003

  Final Notice issued on 9 December 2003 on Abbey National plc 1. THE PENALTY 1.1. On 9 December 2003 the FSA imposed a financial penalty on Abbey National plc of £2,000,000 in respect of breaches of Rule 3.2.6 of the FSA's Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls Sourcebook (SYSC) and of Rules 3.1.3 and 4.3.2 of the FSA's Money Laundering Sourcebook (ML). 2. REASONS FOR THE PROPOSED ACTION 2.1. Prior to November 2000, Abbey National had a system of centralised monitoring of compliance with its anti-money laundering (AML) policies and procedures. However, from November 2000, due to a re-allocation of resources, the approach was amended such that reliance was placed on a branch self-certification process. The management information that was produced by this self-certification process was not sufficient for the central MLRO function adequately to assess Abbey National's compliance with ML and the Money Laundering Regulations 1993 (the Regulations). 2.2. In March 2003 Abbey National's Group Internal Audit function (GIA) carried out a review of Abbey National's compliance with its customer identification requirements. The report identified substantial failures in the adherence to the requirements, including non-compliance rates of 32% in respect of the identification of new customers. 2.3. As a result of GIA's findings and other concerns about the adequacy of Abbey National's AML monitoring arrangements, on 18 June 2003 the FSA appointed investigators under section 168 of the Act. 2.4. In addition to the substantial failures reported by GIA, the investigators identified serious failures in relation to Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs). Of the SARs that Abbey National submitted to the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) in respect of transactions occurring during 2002, over half were submitted more than 30 days after they had been reported internally to the central MLRO function, with the last one not submitted until October 2003. 2.5. The FSA has concluded that Abbey National has contravened SYSC Rule 3.2.6 and ML Rules 3.1.3 and 4.3.2. 2.6. In so doing Abbey National has demonstrated extremely serious failings that demand a very substantial financial penalty. These failings are viewed by the FSA as particularly serious in light of the following factors: (1) in respect of transactions undertaken or attempted by customers in 2002, the failure to ensure that suspicious transactions were considered and reported promptly to NCIS by Abbey National's central MLRO function demonstrated that, in the past, Abbey National had shown such a marked lack of regard for its regulatory obligations as to present a substantial risk to the FSA's statutory objectives, including the reduction of financial crime; (2) the failure by Abbey National adequately to monitor compliance with ML also demonstrated that, in the past, Abbey National had shown such a marked lack of regard for its regulatory obligations as again to present a substantial risk to the FSA's statutory objectives, including the reduction of financial crime; (3) a failure rate of 32% in the identification of customers is of itself very serious; (4) Abbey National's failings occurred against a background where statutory requirements for firms to have in place AML procedures, including procedures to identify their clients, had been in place for over eight years and where, in anticipation of the FSA's new powers to make Rules relating to the prevention of money laundering with effect from 1 December 2001, there had been a greatly increased emphasis on preventing the use of the financial system for financial crime. 2.7. It is a cornerstone of the UK's AML regime that regulated firms must report promptly information about suspicious transactions that their customers have entered into or are attempting to enter into. An essential element of the reporting requirement is that firms obtain and keep sufficient evidence of their customers' identity to enable law enforcement to identify individuals involved in money laundering and to link them with criminal funds attempting to pass through the UK financial system. This is absolutely vital in assisting the detection, investigation and prevention of financial crime. 2.8. In failing to ensure that suspicious transactions are reported on a timely basis and to identify their customers properly, Abbey has potentially hindered the ability of law enforcement to detect and prosecute money launderers. Furthermore, its failure to monitor compliance adequately has left it open to abuse by money launderers and consequent reputational risk. 2.9. The FSA considers that Abbey's failings are indicative of wider systems and controls failings across the Abbey National Group over a prolonged period of time. The wider failings have included inadequate monitoring of key regulatory risks and inadequate identification and gathering of key management information. The overall control environment and, in particular, overall compliance monitoring has been weak across the group. 2.10. The FSA notes, however, that these wider systems and controls issues are in the process of being addressed by Abbey National through a programme of review and enhancement of its control environment. Although it has decided not to take formal disciplinary action concerning these wider failings, the FSA will be closely monitoring Abbey National's performance against a strict remedial action plan that it has agreed with Abbey National and the work is to be completed within a short, defined timetable. The Chief Executive of the Abbey National Group has confirmed the commitment of the Board to ensuring the full and timely implementation of the remedial action plan. 2.11. The FSA also notes that Abbey National reported the findings in the GIA report to the FSA as soon as it became aware of them in April 2003 and took prompt and effective remedial action to address those findings. 2.12. Without those effective remedial steps and the remedial action plan now being implemented, and without the co-operation afforded to the FSA's investigation and the early settlement of the case, the financial penalty proposed would have been even higher. 3. FACTORS RELEVANT TO DETERMINING THE SANCTION 3.1. In determining that it is appropriate to propose a financial penalty and that the amount proposed is proportionate to Abbey National's breaches, the FSA considers the following factors to be particularly relevant. The duration, frequency and nature of the breaches 3.2. The failure to submit SARs promptly occurred from February 2002 to October 2003 (when the last of the 2002 SARs were submitted to NCIS). 3.3. The lack of adequate compliance monitoring occurred from 1 December 2001 to April 2003. 3.4. On the basis of the GIA findings, high rates of non-compliance with customer identification requirements were prevalent across Abbey National's Retail banking division. The inadequacies of Abbey National's monitoring of compliance before April 2003 means that it is not possible to establish the prior duration of the failings. 3.5. The FSA views as particularly serious Abbey National's failure to ensure that SARs were promptly considered and reported to NCIS and the failure effectively to monitor and review compliance with ML and the Regulations. Both failings are fundamental to the effectiveness of the UK's AML regime and the FSA's statutory objective to reduce financial crime. Conduct following the contravention 3.6. Abbey National's senior management took prompt and effective action to address the issues raised by GIA as soon as the findings of the GIA report became known. In addition, the GIA report was provided to the FSA as soon as it was finalised. 3.7. On becoming aware of the FSA's intention to investigate, Abbey National's senior management demonstrated at the highest level its willingness to co-operate fully with the investigation and its desire to resolve this matter as expeditiously as possible. This has helped the FSA to work expeditiously towards its regulatory objectives, which include the reduction of financial crime. 3.8. Abbey National has acknowledged its wider systems and control issues across the Group, not just those concerning ML, and is undertaking promptly and effectively to remedy these issues. The FSA is monitoring this action closely. Previous action taken by the FSA 3.9. This case involves three very significant failings by Abbey National. It failed to: (1) report suspicious transactions to NCIS on a timely basis (ML 4.3.2); (2) monitor its compliance with AML procedures, systems and controls (SYSC 3.2.6), and (3) obtain sufficient evidence of the identity of its customers (ML 3.1.3). 3.10. The FSA has had regard to previous cases involving breaches of ML. While there are precedents for firms failing to identify clients, there are no precedents for the other breaches. The cumulative effect of the three breaches is such that the seriousness of this case is far greater than those cases involving a single type of breach. The case also demonstrates the marked lack of regard for its regulatory obligations that Abbey National had shown in the past. 3.11. Each of the breaches individually merits a substantial penalty. Taken together, they justify a very high penalty. 4. CONCLUSION 4.1. Abbey National has demonstrated extremely serious control failings in respect of its AML procedures which occurred within the context of weak compliance controls across the Group. In particular the failure to report SARs on a timely basis undermines a crucial aspect of the UK's AML regime. 4.2. The serious nature of the AML breaches and the risk they posed to the FSA's statutory objective to reduce financial crime demand that a very substantial financial penalty be imposed in this case. Without the effective remedial steps taken by Abbey National after April 2003 and the action described in paragraph 5.8, and without the co-operation afforded to the investigation and the early settlement of the case, the penalty would have been even higher. 4.3. In all the circumstances the FSA has decided to impose on Abbey National amount a financial penalty of £2 million.

Common questions

Frequently asked questions